Because of growing stocks of grain and the can conclude that resource allocation was reinstitution of production controls, the queschanged, or "biased," toward the increased tion of what allocative impacts such controls relative use of various inputs or production of imply is once again relevant. The prospect that various outputs. By quantifying the extent of restrictions on land use may initiate an intensthis bias, one can determine exactly how relaification in the use of substitute inputs such as tive utilization or production changed. fertilizer, which are already high in price, is disSuppose producers employ a wide variety of couraging. Although the issue is an old one, inputs (X 1 , X2... Xn) which can be adjusted as empirical evidence on the extent of these efdesired by purchasing more at market prices fects is incomplete.' The purpose of this article (r 1 , r 2 . . . rn). Also, suppose producers use is to derive a convenient means of measuring inputs (01, 2 ... Oq) whose services are fixed or the allocative effects of changes in input rerestricted for any number of reasons: the abstrictions. As an example of empirical applicasence of rental markets, lags in adjustments, tion, results are presented which indicate the or government restrictions announced through impact of acreage restrictions during the various regulations. The state of technology, marketing quota years in North and South T, may also be a constraint of this type. FinalDakota.
ly, all these inputs are used to produce a varGiven that government acreage control poliiety of outputs (Y 1 , Y ... Ym) which may be cies place restrictions on land use, does such sold at expected prices (P 1 , P 2 ... Pm). policy lead to changes in the mix of outputs or
If the producers formulate their production inputs and, if so, to what extent? These quesplans in an attempt to maximize expected tions can be addressed by means of a concept profits, it is convenient to describe the relation based on a generalization of Hicks' measure of between these choices and their determinants the bias of technical change. Just as technical by a set of output supply and input demand change may shift isoquants in many different functions. ways, the changes in the level of any restricted or fixed input will shift isoquants which trace (1) YI = Yi (P 1 ... Pm, r ... r, 1 ... q) optimal combinations of variable inputs. In i = ,. m either case, shifts in isoquants may result in a change in the combination of resources em-(2) Xh = X(P... , r... rn 0 ... O q) ployed. Similarly, in a multiple output situah= , ... n tion, changes in technology or fixed factors may shift production possibility curves and Does the shift in isoquants or production lead to changes in the choice of outputs.
possibility frontiers result in a change in optiFollowing Hicks' terminology, one can meamal relative choices although all relative prices sure the impact of policy-imposed input restrichave been held constant? Figure 1 shows tions in terms of the biases they introduce in graphically that if an increase in a fixed factor resource allocation. If the land restrictions led leads to a parallel shift of isoproduct curves so to no change in the relative use of pairs of inthat the optimal choice for the indicated price puts or in the relative production of pairs of ratios remains along the ray A, the impact of outputs, one can conclude that the restrictions the change could be said to be Hicks neutral. were "neutral" in their impact on input and
If the change leads to a new optimal choice output mixes. If the policy led to changes in which is to the right of A, e.g., point b, then the these mixes, then in Hicks' terminology one impact has been Xh saving in relation to Xk. If One complication with this measure should the new optimal choice is to the left of A, at say be noted. Although the rules 3 and 4 upon point c, the change may be said to have been Xh which 5 and 6 are based are not influenced by using in relation to Xk. These conditions can be direction of the change of the fixed factor (0,), summarized conveniently with the following the definitions 5 and 6 are influenced. This rule 2 effect follows from the fact that the direction A change in a fixed factor (0,) has been of the change of Or determines the sign of dr,. Therefore, one could define rules identical to 3 and 4 using the bias concepts 5 and 6 for posi- (3) saving dX* dX tive changes in dOr; however, for negative Xh, neutral relative to Xk as -k changes the inequality signs would be reusing Xh Xk versed. Because it is more interesting to determine the impact of a tightening of input reh k= , ... n. strictions, the following rules relate to decreases in restricted inputs (or "tightening" of restrictions). By the same logic an increase in a fixed fac-A tightening of restrictions (decrease in Or) tor would lead to an outward shift in the prohas been duction possibilities frontier as in Figure lb . Does this change lead, ceteris paribus, to a change in output mix away from ray A? The saving impact of such a change on output mix can be (7) Xh neutral relative to Xk as k 0 described by the following rule. using The change in a fixed factor (er) has led to V h + k = 1, ... n.
'For measurement of the impact, d
{ --A Hicks neutral or Xh saving or using impact in relation to Xk is indicated by this total differential being equal to, greater than, or less than zero.
A tightening of restrictions (decrease in Or)
elasticities involved in equations 5 and 6. has led to In work reported elsewhere, Weaver [13] , preseason tions were placed on the number of acres that precipitation (R), wheat allotment (A), and feed could be planted to wheat and feed grains, and grain base (B). Futures prices were used as were enforced by a system of penalties which measures of expected output prices after exwould be imposed on producers who marketed tensive study of the information content of grain in excess of the normal production of the past series of prices. As concluded by Weaver allotted acreage. This allotted acreage was [13] , if one maintains the hypothesis that inforintended to be a policy instrument which mation is readily available, and if futures would set a limit on the acreage a producer markets are efficient [see 7], then futures price could plant. When allotted acreages were set at will reflect all information which is useful in levels which required the producer to reduce improving the accuracy of price forecasting. planted acreage, the policy imposed a However, as shown by Weaver [13] , this is not constraint on the firm's decision and the levels generally the case for adaptive extrapolations of the constraint represent a type of fixed of past prices as used by Nerlove [11] and factor for the firm. 3 Given this interpretation, others. Furthermore, under these conditions one can use the foregoing methodology to the hypothesis of expected profit maximizainvestigate the nature of allocative biases tion implies that all producers hold the same which may have resulted from acreage controls expectations. This assumption has been relied during the quota years. Specifically, the upon since Nerlove's [11] work with adaptive problem is to obtain estimates of the expectations. These assumptions lead one to 3Research by the author 113, 141 has failed to reject the hypothesis that acreage controls during the quota years in these states placed binding constraints on acreage utilization.
'A complete description of the sample is given in [13] . State-level aggregate data were chosen in the absence of farm-level time series. After extensive review of census data describing the distribution of farm expenses and product mixes, it was concluded that North and South Dakota were sufficiently homogeneous in type and design of farm to allow results based on aggregate data to be of interest. Certainly, any heterogeneity in the present sample is much less severe than that found in typical supply studies, e.g., Nerlove [11] , Houck and Ryan [101, Griliches [6] , Gardner [5] . Data employed relied heavily on USDA price, expense, and revenue series. Expenses were obtained from unpublished records of USDA, Farm Income Situation, and Changes in Production and Efficiency. Revenues were gathered from Agricultural Statistics and various state publications. Input price aggregates were constructed from detailed price data reported in state publications and expenditure weights reported in Major Statistical Series and How They Are Constructed. Futures prices were employed as measures of price expectations for crops with the exception of those hay and forage crops which are not traded on futures markets. For such crops and for livestock, one period lagged prices obtained from Agricultural Statistics and state publications were employed. "See Zellner [16] . expect that observations of futures prices of h is fertilizer (FERT) and input k is capital harvest contracts during the production (CAP), 3 FERT,CAP is -. 006 and -. 0091 for North planning period will serve as accurate approxiand South Dakota, respectively. Using rule 7, mations of producer expectations.
one sees that this implies the acreage restricMeasures of biases for particular input and tions were fertilizer using in relation to capital output pairs were calculated as in equations 5 services. In other words, the negative elasticand 6 by using estimates of the elasticities of ity of fertilizer utilization with respect to a choices with respect to wheat allotments and change in the allotment exceeded that of capiwith respect to feed grain base restrictions pretal utilization. The same effect is seen for fertisented by Weaver [13] . Because the reported lizer use in relation to materials (MAT) and measures of biases involve a nonlinear combipetroleum products (PET). For the impact of nation of normally distributed parameters, the fertilizer use in relation to labor, PLAB,FERT is distribution of the bias measures is not normal .023 and .027 in North and South Dakota, reand is difficult to characterize. Confidence spectively. Recalling from equation 9 that intervals therefore are not reported. Table I re-PLAB,FERT = -PFERT,LAB, one finds that 3 FERT,LAB ports the measures of bias introduced by wheat was -. 023 and -. 027 in the two states. That is, allotments in North and South Dakota. Table 2 the allotments led to an increase in fertilizer reports bias of feed grain restrictions. Because use in relation to labor. Similarly, Table 1 indithe estimates are based on choice functions cates a shift into capital and materials use in which were not restricted to be consistent with relation to petroleum products. By the rule in homogeneity, or any other a priori restriction equation 9, allotments led to a saving of capion technology, they are expected to vary over tal in relation to materials. These nonzero efpoints of observation, time, and cross-section fects are of small magnitude. One can conclude This expectation follows from the fact that the from these results that although wheat acreage derivatives of the production function that lie controls led to changes in the relative choices behind the choice elasticities were allowed to of inputs, those changes were not strongly change between different points on the producbiased toward the use of a particular input tion surface. The point estimates reported in (e.g., fertilizer). Table 1 indicate that although allotments were As illustrated in Table 2 , feed grain bases on not neutral in their impact on decisions (i.e., p + the whole had very different effects on resource 0), the magnitudes of their allocative effects allocation, although the magnitudes of were small. 6 A reduction in the wheat allotchanges in relative factor utilizations were ment was found to result in fertilizer (FERT) very small as in the case of wheat allotments. being substituted for all other variable inputs.
Using equation 7 as a basis for interpretation For example, one sees from Table 1 "Weaver [131 statistically tested the hypothesis that acreage controls during the quota years were Hicks neutral. By appropriate F-tests of parameter restrictions which are sufficient conditions for Hicks neutrality, the hypothesis was rejected for the current sample. the exception of a nearly zero effect in South reductions in the base acreage resulted in the Dakota for the change in labor relative to fertiexpected substitution of wheat and livestock lizer use). All other inputs were substituted for production. The strongest change in mix occurfertilizer in North Dakota, whereas in South red in South Dakota where the percentage inDakota fertilizer was substituted for all other crease in livestock exceeded that of the deinputs. Capital was found to be substituted for crease in feed grains by 9 percent. materials and petroleum and the latter was
The results indicate that although input found to be substituted for materials, controls may cause a reallocation of resources, On the output side, as seen in Table 1 , a rethe extent of that effect may be inconsequenduction in allotments was found with few tial and depends on the nature of production exceptions to have allocative effects which possibilities. Although the results are specific averaged only about a 1 percent change in one to the sample, the methodology is readily output over another. Exceptions to this patadaptable for application to alternative tern were found for the wheat allotment in samples, types of diversified farms or busiSouth Dakota where a reduction in the nesses, and alternative government regulaallotment resulted in a 3 percent greater reductions which effectively restrict input tion in wheat than increase in feed grains in utilization or output supply. both states. In the case of feed grains bases,
